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AWARDING PRESIDENTIAL ELECTORS BY 
CONGRESSIONAL DISTRICT: WRONG FOR 
CALIFORNIA, WRONG FOR THE NATION 
Sam Hirsch* † 
The unfairness of the proposed California Presidential Election Reform 
Act is obvious: in a close election, the Act virtually assures that California’s 
fifty-five electoral votes, which would be expected to go entirely to the De-
mocratic presidential candidate under the traditional statewide-winner-take-
all system, will instead be split, with more than a third of them going to the 
Republican candidate. Implementing this “reform” in the nation’s largest 
Democratic state, but not in any of the large Republican states (like Texas), 
is roughly the equivalent of handing over to the Republicans the state of 
Illinois. What is less obvious is that the Act would be unfair and unwise 
even if it applied nationwide. 
The Act embodies the “congressional-district system” for awarding elec-
tors to presidential candidates. That system gives the statewide popular-vote 
winner only two electors and allocates the remaining electors on a district-
by-district basis, awarding each district’s lone elector to whichever presiden-
tial candidate carries that particular district. This system sounds eminently 
fair to many casual observers, and it would likely have the benefit of en-
couraging presidential candidates to compete aggressively in a larger 
number of states. Indeed, even as sophisticated an observer of the political 
scene as Professor Bruce Cain of the University of California at Berkeley 
was recently quoted in the San Diego Union-Tribune as saying that, al-
though the congressional-district system for awarding electors is “a horrible 
idea if it’s applied only to California,” the “idea itself is fine if it’s applied to 
all states.” 
I believe the latter conclusion is wrong for two reasons. First, the con-
gressional-district system not only would increase the chance that the 
Electoral College would generate the “wrong winner,” that is, that the presi-
dency would be awarded to the second-place finisher in popular votes, but it 
would do so in a way that is significantly biased to favor one political party. 
Second, the congressional-district system is founded on the erroneous as-
sumption that congressional-district lines are politically “neutral” and thus 
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well suited to functions other than electing members of the U.S. House of 
Representatives. 
Contrary to popular belief, currently the Electoral College is not signifi-
cantly biased to favor either political party. Some critics have noted that the 
four presidential candidates who have been denied the presidency despite 
winning a plurality of the popular vote nationwide—Al Gore in 2000, 
Grover Cleveland in 1888, Samuel Tilden in 1876, and Andrew Jackson in 
1824—were all Democrats. But partisan voting patterns have changed 
enormously since the 19th century, rendering that point meaningless. And, 
even though it is true that in 2000 Gore lost the Electoral College after win-
ning the popular tally by more than a half million votes, the 1996 and 2004 
elections show that the system today is not consistently biased against De-
mocrats. Had the nationwide popular vote been roughly tied in the 1996 and 
2004 elections, Bill Clinton would have beaten Bob Dole by about twenty 
electors and John Kerry would have beaten George W. Bush by about thirty 
electors. So the same system that saved the Republican candidate in 2000 
instead favored the Democratic candidates in 1996 and 2004, albeit by 
smaller and far less consequential amounts. 
By contrast, under the nationwide application of the congressional-
district system that Professor Cain and others have defended, all three Re-
publican candidates (Dole in 1996 and Bush in 2000 and 2004) would have 
prevailed handily if the nationwide popular vote had been roughly tied. For 
example, assuming a nationwide tie vote under the congressional-district 
system, Bush would have won the Electoral College by about seventy-four 
and fifty-two electoral votes in 2000 and 2004, respectively. To see why this 
is so, it is useful to define partisan bias and then unpack its various compo-
nents. 
Partisan bias is generally defined as an electoral system’s tendency to 
systematically favor one political party over another in translating popular 
votes into seats (whether in a legislature or in the Electoral College). An 
unbiased system treats the two major parties symmetrically. So if the two 
parties’ presidential candidates have equal support in the national electorate, 
each should expect to win a roughly equal number of electors and to have a 
roughly equal chance to capture the presidency. Likewise, if a candidate 
succeeds in attracting support from well over half of the electorate, he 
should expect to be rewarded with more than half of the electors and thus 
with the presidency—regardless of the candidate’s political party. 
The congressional-district system would inject into the Electoral College 
a significant and consistent partisan slant because it combines “malappor-
tionment bias” and “distributional bias.” Under the traditional system, the 
presidential election effectively consists of fifty-one winner-take-all con-
tests—one in each state, plus the District of Columbia. (For simplicity’s 
sake, I’m ignoring the fact that two small states, Maine and Nebraska, have 
already adopted the congressional-district system.) Under a nationwide ap-
plication of the congressional-district system, the contests would still be 
winner-take-all, but there would be 487 of them—fifty-one statewide con-
tests for two electors apiece, plus 436 district-wide contests for one elector 
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apiece (one in each of the 435 House districts and one in the District of Co-
lumbia). For the District of Columbia or any of the seven states that 
currently has only one representative in Congress (and thus only three elec-
tors), it is possible to re-conceptualize the contest as a statewide race for 
three electors, but that would not significantly alter the analysis presented 
here. 
Malapportionment bias is the main problem with having fifty-one state-
wide contests for two electors apiece. This form of partisan bias comes from 
apportioning the same number of seats to a lightly populated area as to a 
heavily populated one. The classic example of a malapportioned legislative 
body is the U.S. Senate, where California and Wyoming each get two Sena-
tors, even though the former now has more than fifty times as many 
residents (and voters) as the latter. If one major party’s political strength is 
located disproportionately in relatively large states, and the other party’s 
strength is located disproportionately in the smaller states, the former party 
will be harmed by (and the latter party will profit from) a malapportionment 
bias. 
Empirically, such malapportionment bias would exist today under the 
congressional-district system. Republicans, who tend to run well in rural 
areas, are stronger in small states, while Democrats, who tend to run well in 
urban areas, are stronger in large states. This explains why Bush could carry 
thirty and thirty-one states in 2000 and 2004, respectively, without winning 
a nationwide landslide: he won most of the smaller states, while his Democ-
ratic opponents won most of the larger states. The congressional-district 
system would effectively award the first 102 electors to the winners of the 
fifty-one statewide contests, regardless of population. In an election where 
the nationwide popular vote is roughly tied, that system would have given 
the Republicans something like a sixty-two to forty lead in electoral votes—
even before any of the congressional-district-based electors were awarded. 
The congressional-district system would be even more heavily biased 
when awarding the 436 district-based electors. The problem here is not 
malapportionment bias, as each district has, very roughly, the same total 
population. Rather, the problem is distributional bias. A party’s support is 
more efficiently distributed if there are many districts that favor the party by 
only relatively narrow margins. Having lots of support in districts that favor 
the party by landslide margins is an inefficient distribution, as such districts 
waste votes that otherwise might have determined the outcomes in more 
competitive districts. 
Again, there is no doubt about the current empirical situation: by any 
reasonable measure, the twenty-seven or twenty-eight least competitive 
congressional districts today are all Democratic districts. Most of them are 
urban districts located in the New York, Los Angeles, and Chicago metro-
politan areas. And almost all of these politically lopsided districts are 
heavily African-American or Latino. Because these urban, predominantly 
minority districts soak up huge numbers of Democratic votes and very few 
Republican votes, the remaining 400-plus districts tilt significantly Republi-
can in a close presidential election. 
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For example, under the congressional maps currently in place, Bush 
would have won 238 district-based electors to Gore’s 198, even though Gore 
won a half million more popular votes. Had Bush actually tied Gore nation-
wide, his advantage would have risen to about 241 to 195. When that 
distributional bias is added to the sixty-two-to-forty malapportionment-bias-
infused edge in electors chosen statewide, the Republican advantage in the 
Electoral College—again, assuming a roughly tied popular vote nation-
wide—is a whopping 303 to 235. That is a very substantial bias, roughly 
akin to conceding New York and Vermont to the Republicans before the 
campaign even begins. 
Although the precise size of the partisan bias may change significantly 
from election to election, the underlying reasons for the bias in the congres-
sional-district system run deep and are unlikely to disappear as voting patterns 
evolve. As redrawn after every federal decennial census, congressional-district 
lines are “political” in both intent and effect, and therefore they can never pro-
vide a truly “neutral” basis for awarding presidential electors. 
At bottom, the Electoral College is a mechanism for tying control of the 
presidency to the voters’ preferences. By contrast, our system for electing 
representatives to Congress is not merely a mechanism for effectuating vot-
ers’ preferences about which political party should control the U.S. House of 
Representatives. For a term of 730 days, each representative is supposed to 
exercise his or her judgment about what is in the best interests not only of 
the nation but also of the representative’s particular congressional district. 
An elector’s job is far narrower—to cast a single vote, on a single occasion, 
for a single slate of presidential and vice-presidential candidates. Today, 
each elector is actively discouraged, and in some states expressly forbidden, 
from exercising personal judgment in casting that vote. 
Relatedly, representatives are expected to “represent” their constituents 
not only substantively, in terms of sharing similar public-policy preferences, 
but also descriptively, in terms of sharing similar demographic and socio-
economic backgrounds. In a nation where non-Hispanic whites now 
constitute less than two-thirds of the population, having an all-white or 
nearly all-white “House of Representatives” would be worse than a misno-
mer; it would be an affront to our most cherished claims of democracy and 
equality. But while many engaged citizens know (and care about) who 
represents them in the House, almost no one is aware of who “represents” 
them in the Electoral College. 
Congressional-district lines are drawn to address a variety of concerns, 
including ensuring fair representation of local communities and guarantee-
ing at least a minimally acceptable level of descriptive representation for 
minority citizens in the halls of our national legislature. Most of these con-
cerns are utterly irrelevant to the Electoral College and its mission. Because 
congressional elections, and thus congressional-district lines, serve such a 
broad range of goals, they are unsuitable for choosing electors. Just to take 
one obvious example: viewed solely through the lens of Electoral College 
reform, the twenty-seven or twenty-eight most lopsided congressional dis-
tricts in the nation are just a source of partisan bias, soaking up Democratic 
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votes and tilting the electoral playing field to favor Republican presidential 
candidates. But viewed through the lens of the congressional elections for 
which these districts were created, they are a source of great diversity in the 
House of Representatives—racially, ethnically, experientially, and ideologi-
cally. 
As other contributors to this symposium surely will note, there are 
plenty of solid reasons to fault our current system of electing the President 
of the United States. But the current system is not so badly broken that any 
reform would be an improvement. If adopted only by the people of Califor-
nia, the congressional-district system for awarding presidential electors 
would be grossly unfair. But even if adopted uniformly in all states, the sys-
tem would inject a new source of partisan bias into our political process and 
would be a major step backwards for our democracy. 
